

THE GREAT CRUISE 1946

Report To THE SECRETARY

By

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**Historical Division
Office of Information
Headquarters
United States Air Force in Europe
March 1963**

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Extract from

**THE CUBAN CRISIS, 1962:
IMPACT IN THE USAF AREA**

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GENERAL TRUMAN H. LANDON
Commander in Chief
United States Air Forces Europe

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
A. THE BACKGROUND	<u>1</u>
B. THE AIR FORCE CUBAN CRISIS STATUS	7
C. USAF ACTIONS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS	10
1. The Soviet Threat In Cuba	10
2. Relationship of The Cuban Crisis to Berlin	12
3. The NATO INM Factor	13
4. The USAF Impact	15
Command Costs	23
WMI Shipment Summary	24
CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISIS	25
FOOTNOTES	39
GLOSSARY	44

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1	Map, USAF-Cuban Crisis Relationship	111
		<u>Facing Page</u>
2	Map, USAF Key Bases - Cuban Crisis 1962	18
3	Table, USAF Alert Status	19
4	Photograph, US Air Force C-135 jet transport	24
5	Photograph, USAF tactical aircrews.	25

USAFE-CUBAN CRISIS RELATIONSHIP



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Page 4

Fig 1

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"It takes as much self-discipline, understanding
and perseverance to prevent a war as to fight one."

General Truman H. Landon, CINCSAFE

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Page 5

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THE CUBAN CRISIS
1962

A. THE BACKGROUND

In a televised address to the Nation during the evening of 22 October 1962, President John F. Kennedy revealed that the Soviet Union was in the process of rapidly building up launching sites for medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba. ¹ "The purpose of these bases," the President said, "can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere."

Close United States aerial surveillance of the Soviet military activities in Cuba had established, less than a week before the President spoke, "unmistakable evidence" of preparation of the missile launching sites. From these bases, Mr. Kennedy said, mobile medium range ballistic missiles (SSBM), carrying nuclear warheads, could strike in a matter of minutes Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any city in the Southeastern United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area. Other sites, when completed, would permit the firing of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) that could hit the major cities of the Western Hemisphere from Hudson's Bay, Canada, to Lima, Peru. In addition, Russian jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons were being assembled in Cuba while the necessary air bases were being prepared.

R26

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Page 6

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The President on 22 October outlined seven "initial" steps, which he warned might be "only the beginning," that he had ordered to be taken immediately:

1. "... a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba." All ships bound for Cuba "from whatever nation or port," would, "if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back." If necessary, the quarantine was to be extended to other types of cargo and carriers.
2. "... continued and close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup." If offensive military preparations continued, "further action" would be justified. The US Armed Forces had been directed to "prepare for any eventualities."
3. "... any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere" would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kennedy also announced a reinforcement of the United States naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba, and calls for emergency meetings of the Organization of American States (OAS), to invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of "all necessary action," and the United Nations (UN), to present a United States draft resolution calling for "the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of UN observers," before the quarantine could be lifted. The President

R26

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Page 7

UNCLASSIFIED

also called upon Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to "halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace . . . to move the world back from the abyss of destruction -by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba . . ."

The OAS on 23 October unanimously voted to support the United States' decision to impose a military quarantine on Cuba.² President Kennedy issued a proclamation on "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba," which spelled out the types of weapons and equipment that would be prohibited from entry to Cuba, and directed the Secretary of Defense (SOD), Mr. Robert S. McNamara, to "take appropriate measures to enforce the order." "In carrying out the order," the proclamation stated, "force shall be used only to the extent necessary."

The SOD took implementing action declaring the Cuban quarantine effective at 1000 hours Zebra, 24 October 1962.³ Admiral George Anderson was named Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), with the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), Admiral Robert L. Dennison, being the responsible Unified Commander, and Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, Commander, US Second Fleet, named as Commander of Task Force 136 for this blockade operation. Executive Order 11058 was issued authorizing the SOD to call up 150,000 US Armed Forces reserve personnel, the limit set by The Congress, if necessary. Thus, between 22 October and 25 October the United States

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Page 8

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acted swiftly and firmly to protect the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world in what was commonly called the "Cuban Crisis."⁴

The Department of Defense (DOD) announced the first Navy interception of a Soviet ship enroute to Cuba on 25 October, about 22 hours after the President's proclamation of the quarantine of offensive arms for Cuba had taken effect.⁵ This ship, the oil tanker "Bucharest," was allowed to continue after the Navy ascertained that it carried only petroleum. About a dozen other Soviet ships enroute to the island altered course that same day to avoid a similar encounter, presumably because they carried prohibited arms. By 27-28 October, negotiations between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev had reached agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons systems from Cuba, but the problems of United States insistence upon on-site verification of the removal of Soviet insistence upon an American pledge⁶ never to invade Cuba were left unresolved. Too, an estimated 17,000 Soviet military "technicians" remained on the island.**

* Premier Khrushchev suggested the United States dismantle the NATO IRBM's in Turkey and Italy in exchange for the Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba but this was rejected by the United States.

** According to LGO public announcements, of the 17,000 Soviet troops, after an estimated 5,000 ballistic missile personnel were withdrawn, about 5,000 were organized in four battalion strength combat units - highly mobile armored task forces with assault guns, T-54 tanks, and so forth, and the remaining 12,000 were anti-aircraft support and instructor personnel.

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Page 9

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5

Following a US Navy "along side" count of 42 Soviet ballistic missiles and supporting equipment on outbound ships from Cuba in the preceding two weeks, the President on 20 November lifted the United States quarantine of Cuba in return for a pledge by Premier Khrushchev that the Soviet jet bombers would also be removed within 30 days.⁷ US Navy patrol planes were ordered by the DOD to track down and photograph the Russian ships departing Cuba with these aircraft. The following day, the SOD directed the release of 14,200 Air Force Reserve (AFR) personnel recalled to active duty with 24 troop carrier and six aerial port squadrons on 28 October. Some 63 Cuban blockade ships carrying about 25,000 US Armed Forces personnel were returned to their home ports for the Thanksgiving weekend. Tactical Air Command (TAC) units began redeploying to normal duty stations from bases in Florida and special Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-47 dispersal and B-52 airborne alerts were discontinued. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty organization announced a similar termination of the alert status for their forces.

In summarization, there was little doubt that if the Soviet design in Cuba had been completed without any intervention by the United States, the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere would have been radically altered and a large portion of the United States nuclear striking forces would have faced serious problems in maintaining its survivability and deterrent capability.⁸ Highly significant also was the fact that the Soviet

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Page 10

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Union, for the first time since becoming a nuclear power, entrusted its missiles and missile installations outside its own territorial limits and allowed them to be installed in the far-off Caribbean. This represented a major change in Soviet policy, since not even Communist East European satellites had been provided with Soviet offensive missile bases.

However, there was some public skepticism about the 1,000 mile range claimed for the Soviet MRBM's in Cuba by United States official spokesmen, since these missiles had not previously been credited with more than 500 mile range. Conversely, public news media tended to overlook the role of the Soviet Ilyushin (IL)-28 "Beagle" fleet in the Cuban military buildup picture. This venerable veteran of the early subsonic jet age, with its 800 mile radius of action, would have given Castro a reconnaissance, air drop, and Communist "revolution" support capability in the Caribbean that he had previously lacked. Therefore, the Soviets tried as long as possible to keep the IL-28's in Cuba outside the scope of the "offensive" weapon evacuation.

There was also, possibly, grounds for doubt over the thoroughness of Russia's missile pull-out from Cuba. ⁹ Some non-military experts believed that Soviet rocket construction techniques made it entirely likely that large numbers of ballistic missiles might still be on the Communist-dominated island.

One public news source charged that incidents during the Cuban Crisis had increased friction between civilian and military

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Page 11

10
 leaders in the DOD. One of these alleged incidents concerned the ordering of a Navy fighter squadron to Key West, Florida, where it came under Air Force control, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense without consulting the JCS or the Service Chiefs. It was said that this transfer order was telephoned directly to CINCLANT and that, when informed, the Air Force and the Navy had to hurriedly improvise to overcome certain inadequacies at the Key West air station to which the Navy squadron had been ordered.

Early in 1963, the Department of Defense advised the House Defense Appropriations Committee that the buildup of the United States forces during the Cuban crisis had cost an estimated \$120 million.
 11

B. THE AIR FORCE CUBAN CRISIS STATUS

When the President announced the quarantine of Cuba on 22 October, SAC B-52's on airborne alert flights and B-47's on training flights joined with the Navy to maintain a watch on the 2,000 ships which were in the Atlantic Ocean area. SAC bombers made hundreds of visual and photographic sightings and relayed this information and several thousand feet of aerial film to CINCLANT. Movements of Air Force units began immediately after the spotting of the Soviet MRBM's on the island of Cuba.
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By 20 October, TAC fighter, reconnaissance, and troop carrier aircraft, thousands of tons of equipment, and personnel had moved into the Southeastern United States, mainly to bases in Florida.

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This tactical force was operational as soon as the movements were completed. Also on the weekend before the President's quarantine proclamation, SAC began dispersing its aircraft. Several SAC bomber and tanker units were deployed from Florida to other USAF bases to make room for tactical aircraft, and Air Defense Command (ADC) moved fighter interceptors and personnel into the Southeast to supplement its air defense forces in that area. All of these moves were completed before 22 October, including about 125 tons of air evacuation hospital equipment and 1,479 blood units flown to Florida and prepositioned.

During the four weeks of maximum crisis, Air Force fighter interceptors in the Florida area flew more than 20,000 individual fighter patrols, maintaining a 24-hour orbiting of several strategic points in the air off Florida. The maximum force of North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) interceptors and anti-aircraft missiles was on five to 15 minute alert throughout the four weeks.

On 22 October, SAC began a massive airborne alert for its B-52 heavy bombers prior to the President's announcement. The B-52's began 24-hour flights, and before each crew landed, another B-52 crew was airborne to take its place. At the same time the airborne alert was in operation, the remaining SAC bombers were on upgraded ground alert, ready to take off, combat ready, within 15 minutes of the scramble notice. The SAC bomber alert measures required some 2,000 officers and airmen in combat crews to remain

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Page 13

R26

at their alert stations for a period of four weeks without a let-up. SAC intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) were also upgraded to maximum alert. In all, the SAC alerts directly affected 100,000 SAC aircraft and missile maintenance and armament personnel, 20,000 security police, and 6,000 refueling specialists.

Within 48 hours of notification, the Military Air Transport Service (MATs) airlifted a force of US Marines from California to Guantanamo Bay. In all, TAC and MATs troop carrier aircraft moved more than 10,000 personnel and 8,000 tons of cargo to the Southeast and Cuba. The MATs operation required hundreds of transport flights, and immediately after these few days of activity, the command was called upon to initiate a large scale airlift from Germany to Communist-attacked India. TAC fighters flew more than 400 practice missions against simulated special targets in Florida during the early days of the crisis.

Overall, the Air Force flew some 85,000 hours in direct support of the United States operations during the Cuban crisis. On 12-hour notice, some 14,214 AFR troop carrier, aerial port squadron, and reserve tactical hospital personnel were called to active duty with twin-engined C-119 and C-123 troop carrier aircraft. They remained at home bases on standby alert or flew training missions from the time of the call-up until their release from active duty began on 23 November.

R26

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Page 14

C. USMFE ACTIONS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

1. The Soviet Threat In Cuba

The second Cuban Crisis following the advent of Fidel Castro and his Communist cohorts to power¹³ had actually been brewing for some time prior to 22 October 1962. An intensification of shipping into Cuba during August aroused increased United States intelligence surveillance and the US Air Force obtained through aerial reconnaissance the first conclusive evidence of the Soviet missile site construction as early as 14 October.¹⁴ Final photographic confirmation of the MSBM building on the island was secured by the USAF on 20 October, as announced by the Department of Defense two days later.

C. USAF ACTIONS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

The timing, nature and magnitude of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba indicated at an early stage that the Soviet Union was undertaking the establishment of a prime strategic strike base in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵ Preceded by the deployment of large numbers of defensive weapons systems, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), SA-2s and about 100 MIG-15's, 17's, 19's, and 21's, the mixed force of offensive aircraft, IL-28s and long range missiles, SS-4s and SS-5s, represented a major military investment and reflected four key timing factors:

- a. Planning for this strategic buildup had probably been started at least a year earlier.

¹⁵ The abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961 being the first Castro regime "Cuban Crisis."

b. The offensive weapons deployment was put into action late in the spring of 1962.

c. The development of the missile sites themselves had been rapidly executed, indicating priority.

d. Projected full operational status for the MRBMs in late October, the IRBMs between 15 November and 15 December, and the IL-28 aircraft in mid-December 1962 indicated the Soviets may have been planning to develop this force in order to support some form of action in the East-West Cold War within this time period.

The mixed force of 1,020 nautical mile (NM) and 2,200 NM missile sites would have provided the Soviet Union with a significant strike capability against almost all targets in the United States, parts of Canada, and for the first time, a large portion of South America. By deploying stockpiled ballistic missiles in Cuba, against which the United States had no ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) capability, the Soviets very nearly achieved an added deterrent and strike potential close to the United States. Moreover, the estimated total mixed strategic missile force in Cuba planned by the Soviet Union, including refire capability, during the early critical hours of a nuclear war, could have been equal to the initial salvo ICBM capability based in the Soviet Union.

All of the missile sites in Cuba were under the complete domination of the Soviets and there was no evidence that Cubans were involved. The Russians appeared to be conducting two types

of military operations in Cuba in 1962: one in connection with defensive activities in which they acted as advisors and trainers; the other in regard to offensive weapons. In the latter category, particularly in the MGRM and IREM activities, the Soviets had apparently assumed complete authority and could take over property, move out Cubans and control desired areas.

2. Relationship Of The Cuban Crisis to Berlin

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Source: M33 (S) (ADR), Sec State to
USMR SHAPE Et al., 28 Oct 62.

2. Relationship Of The Cuban Crisis to Berlin

(S) There was considerable concern among the Western Powers, particularly in the West German government, that the Soviet military buildup in Cuba in 1962 was primarily designed to provide the Russians with a lever for a showdown on Berlin. It was thought that this showdown might be timed for completion of the nuclear missile sites in Cuba coincident to a visit by Premier Khrushchev to the United Nations headquarters in New York.

16. US
Dept of State

(S) In any case, the clear United States statements that Soviet deployment of offensive missiles to Cuba would not be tolerated made it mandatory that these missiles be eliminated in one way or another if the United States determination to honor its military treaty commitments, including those concerning Berlin, was to remain credible throughout the world. United States diplomacy, therefore, sought from the outset of the Cuban Crisis to make perfectly sure that Allied nations understood the American firmness was their defense against Soviet aggression, and that the Soviet Union realized there was no basis for miscalculation of the United States intentions. It was further emphasized to the Allied nations

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that the Soviet missile bases had a special significance because ballistic missiles based within the Soviet Union and targeted on United States deterrent nuclear forces were still relatively limited in number. Unlike Soviet ICBMs launched over the ice cap, where the United States BMEWS operated, ICBMs in Cuba would be free of radar detection, and with zero alert time, both SAC's ICBM sites and bomber bases would come under attack without warning and with the greater accuracy inherent in short range.

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Reports on the reaction of the Soviet forces in East Germany at the height of the Cuban crisis indicated that it was limited to a general state of alert, reduced training activity at the forward airfields in the center and southern air corridors to Berlin, and improvement of communications along the Helldorf autobahn to Berlin.¹⁷

While the Communists attempted to fan unrest in West Berlin during the crisis, the Soviet Union and its satellite military forces took no overt aggressive actions in this period.

3. The NATO IREB Factor

All of the details of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cuban Crisis were not made public in 1962.¹⁸ However, it was known that the Soviet Union attempted both overtly and covertly to use the existing state of tension to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) IREB capability which had been provided by the United States under the Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE) monitorship.

The Soviet Union publicly offered during October to exchange the withdrawal of Russian offensive missiles from Cuba for the removal of the Jupiter weapon systems emplaced in Italy and Turkey* between 1959 and 1962 under the operational control of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). This offer was rejected by the United States at that time.

On the other hand, at least one newspaper columnist in Washington stated flatly in December 1962 that prior to the Cuban Crisis the DOD had already approved a JCS recommendation that the NATO ICBM's in Italy and Turkey be dismantled. The strengthened United States ICBM capability and a proposed substitution of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean were cited as the prime factors in the alleged NATO missile withdrawal decision.

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(TS) The USAFE war capability was threatened by the requirements in October to ship over one million pounds of ammunition, 20 additional ejector cartridges applicable to F-105's; 20mm HEI ammunition for F-100's and F-105's, and pylons for F-100, F-104, and F-105 aircraft. In addition to affecting overall theater stocks of war consumables, the actual shipments aggravated an imbalance of WRN stocks which had existed since the beginning of the STAIR STEP operation the previous year. With Headquarters

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USAF verbal clearance, in place freeing of WSM stocks in the European theater was lifted to permit orderly buildup at central European bases of reasonable and minimum levels of war consumables. On 20 October 1962, USCINCEUR asked the JCS to transmit any further directives for movement of WSM in the European area through his headquarters. ²³

23. USCINCEUR

(TS) CINCSAFE received instructions on 22 October from USCINCEUR and SACEUR to intensify intelligence collection; security and anti-sabotage measures; command post manning, and checks of equipment and supplies. However, except for the intelligence function, all of these actions had already been instituted by CINCSAFE on or after 17 October. ²⁴ The USCINCEUR-SACEUR directives stated that "no measures would be taken which could be considered provocative or which might disclose operational plans."

24. USCINCEUR
SACEUR

SOURCES:

23. Msg (TS/CADR), USCINCEUR to JCS, 20 Oct 62, subject not available, ECJDA910143

24. Msg (TS/CADR), USCINCEUR to CINCSAFE Et al., 22 Oct 62, subject not available, ECJCA9 101510

Msg (S/CADR), USCINCEUR to CINCSAFE Et al., 23 Oct 62, subject not available, SCHLO 5 - 00373


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USAF tactical aircrews sharpen their combat readiness in one of the command's continuous alert practices. Here 65th Air Division (Defense) pilots race to their F-104 Starfighters at Moron Air Base, Spain.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISES

For the Period

6 October Thru 24 November 1962

6 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

14 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USAF Command Post Summaries stated a priority requirement for expeditious return of TAC's Fox Able 137 from European theater to the CONUS.

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17 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

CINCSAFE directed an increase in the Headquarters USAF Command Post watches. General Landon also directed that command

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

For the Period

6 October Thru 24 November 1962

6 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(TS) CINCSAFE was informed of a need for expedited CINCLANT
314-61 and 316-61 planning, and of CINCLANT's recommendation that

[REDACTED]
earmarked for commitment to these plans but he did not know until

22 October what these plans were. ³⁴ Under CINCLANT's proposal, 24. JCS

14 October

SOURCE: May (TS/CADR), TCS to USCINCEUR,
[REDACTED] Not available - 1446 Z Oct 62.

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and control communications projects in the USAFE area be pushed forward with all possible speed.

COMBAT FORCES

CINCSAFE directed that the combat readiness of all USAFE tactical units be immediately reviewed.³⁷

LOGISTICS

CINCSAFE was directed to ready for immediate MATS airlift to the United States WWM amounting to over 1 million pounds of ammunition; ejector cartridges applicable to F-105's; 20mm WWM ammunition, and pylons for F-100, F-104, and F-105 aircraft.³⁸

18 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

19 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF) asked CINCSAFE to submit on an urgent basis the most recent exercise test data and estimated minimum reaction times under no warning conditions for implementation of the Berlin contingency plans embodied in USAF OPLANS 128-60, 130-60, 156-61, and 157-62. 39


Source: $\ln(y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(\text{AGE}) + \beta_2 \ln(\text{EDUC}) + \beta_3 \ln(\text{EXPER}) + \beta_4 \ln(\text{SEX}) + \beta_5 \ln(\text{MARRIED}) + \beta_6 \ln(\text{CHILDREN}) + \beta_7 \ln(\text{UNEMPLOYED}) + \beta_8 \ln(\text{RETIRED}) + \beta_9 \ln(\text{HOURS}) + \beta_{10} \ln(\text{WAGE}) + \beta_{11} \ln(\text{BONUS}) + \beta_{12} \ln(\text{SALARY}) + \beta_{13} \ln(\text{COMMISSION}) + \beta_{14} \ln(\text{OVERTIME}) + \beta_{15} \ln(\text{TOTAL_PAY})$

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USAFE air defense aircraft modification inputs were suspended and additional emphasis was placed on the completion of all command communications projects in progress. ²⁵ The USAFE annual air defense ground environment was optimized at some expense to the installation and testing of the 412L Air Weapons Control System (AWCS). The Seventeenth Air Force Commander was directed by CINCSAFE to make preparations for shifting the Nuclear Strike Program (NSP) targets of three USAFE strike squadrons in central Europe to tactical fighter units in the United Kingdom and at Aviano Air Base in Italy to permit the assignment of a conventional mission for Berlin operational contingencies to the

USAFE KEY BASES CUBAN CRISIS 1962



three central Europe squadrons. The first actual knowledge of the situation available to CINCSAFE, aside from speculation and public news media, was received during a meeting with USUNICOM²⁶ at Paris, at 1500 hours Zebra, on 22 October.

a. The gradual return over a 48-hour period to European bases of 92 USAF aircraft in training at the USAF Weapons Center at Wheelus Air Base in Libya.

b. Reduction of tactical wing training in central Europe and the United Kingdom.

c. Expedited maintenance to increase the operationally ready (O/R) aircraft to 90 percent O/R.

e. The gradual replacement of the Moron F-104's by 18 F-100C aircraft of the training wing at Wheelus.

* See Figure 4, this study.

USAFE ALERT STATUS

October - November 1962

Oct Pre-Crisis Alert

Crisis Alert Rank

UNITS	15 MIN	OTHER	15 MIN	OTHER	DATE ON
32 FIS	2	6	2	6	No Change
431 FIS	2	8	4	14	23 Oct
435 FIS	2	4	2	17	23 Oct
496 FIS	2	8	2	8	No Change
497 FIS	2	8	4	14	23 Oct
525 FIS	2	8	2	8	No Change
526 FIS	2	8	2	8	No Change
20 TFW	12	23	14	39	23 Oct
36 TFW	9	24	10	16	29 Oct
48 TFW	12	24	14	36	25 Oct
49 TFW	9	24	9	24	No Change
50 TFW	4	35	4	35	21 Oct
81 TFW	12	21	14	28	25 Oct
353 TFS	4	10	5	10	25 Oct
366 TFW	Not on Alert		Not on Alert		
523 TFS	4	9	8	5	29 Oct
613 TFS	4	9	8	5	29 Oct
10 TRW	4	21	8	26	25 Oct
66 TRW	8	10	8	11	3 Nov
38 TRW	48	3	48	3	No Change
420 ARS	1	4	7	0	25 Oct

SOURCE: USAFE Command Post Reports.
 Intv., USAFE Historian, Mr. R. E. Eckwright, with
 Captain A. P. Hamrick, Current Actions Division,
 DC3/Operations, Hq USAFE, 13 Dec 62.

Under a project called

NAME KIE, the command progressed to the point of sending an advance party and logistic support to the German AFB at Furstenfeldbruck at the end of October with the objective of establishing a forward operating location (FOL) for one F-84F squadron of the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing based at Chamont, France, but these arrangements did not receive final SACMUR approval and they had to be cancelled on 1 November 1962.


In summarization, units of the USAFE combat forces during the period of the Cuban Crisis demonstrated a very high degree of ingenuity, esprit de corps, and readiness to carry out their missions. In most instances, CINCSAFE took all actions within his authority before being requested or instructed to do so, and this readiness was the subject of favorable comment from, for example, US Army Staff officers in this area.

Command Costs


As of 31 January 1963, funding obligations incurred by USAFE in connection with actions directly attributable to the Cuban Crisis of 1962 amounted to some \$44,847 in P-458 funds and \$7,500 in P-551 funds.** USAFE was not reimbursed for the unprogrammed \$52,347 Cuban Crisis obligations and was further assessed an Air Force-wide 20 percent reduction in temporary duty (TDY) travel funds for the second half of Fiscal Year 1963 to cover a similar deficit in all of the participating major air commands. As was increasingly the case in "crisis" expenditures during 1961 and 1962, CINCUSAFE was advised that he would have to "live with what he had."

* See Page 24, this study.

** This unprogrammed funding deficit was reflected in a Memorandum, USAFE Vice Commander-in-Chief to All Staff Agencies on 18 February 1963, subject: TDY Fund Shortages in the Field, and Cuban Crisis cost estimates prepared about the same time by USAFE Comptroller.



US Air Force C-135 jet transports loading and unloading cargo and passengers at an Air Base near Frankfurt in West Germany in 1964. The aircraft is shown in the process of loading or unloading shipments.



USAFE tactical aircrews sharpen their combat readiness in one of the command's continuous alert practices. Here 65th Air Division (Defense) pilots race to their F-104 Starfighters at Moron Air Base, Spain.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISES

For the Period

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OPERATIONAL PLANNING

14 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USAF Command Post Summaries stated a priority requirement for expeditious return of TAC's Fox Able 137 from European theater to the COMUS.³⁵

17 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

CINCSAFE directed an increase in the Headquarters USAF Command Post watches.³⁶ General Landon also directed that command

~~TOP SECRET~~

23

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

For the Period

6 October Thru 24 November 1962

6 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(TS) CINCSAF was informed of a need for expedited CINCLANT
314-61 and 316-61 planning, and of CINCLANT's recommendation that

[REDACTED]
earmarked for commitment to these plans but he did not know until
22 October what these plans were. ³⁴ Under CINCLANT's proposal, 34. JCS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

14 October

Source: Mss. (TS/CAWR), JCS to USCINCEUR,
[REDACTED] not available, 0-1446Z Oct 62.

88-FOI-435
88-TS-18

~~TOP SECRET~~

(R1)

and control communications projects in the USAF area be pushed forward with all possible speed.

COMBAT FORCES

CINCSAFE directed that the combat readiness of all USAF tactical units be immediately reviewed.³⁷

LOGISTICS

CINCSAFE was directed to ready for immediate MATS airlift to the United States WHM amounting to over 1 million pounds of ammunition; ejector cartridges applicable to F-105's; 30mm WHM ammunition, and pylons for F-100, F-104, and F-105 aircraft.³⁸

18 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

19 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING


UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF) asked CINCSAFE to submit on an urgent basis the most recent exercise test data and estimated minimum reaction times under no warning conditions for implementation of the Berlin contingency plans embodied in USAF OPLANS 128-60, 130-60, 156-61, and 157-62.³⁹ 39. CSAF

SOURCE: Memo (TS/CAFR). CSAF to CINCSAFE,
15 July 62. Subject not available.
AF-CD-REF 11644

27-08741-AIR-023
LC



US Air Force C-135 jet transports loading
Air Base near Frankfurt in West Germany in
shipments.

LOGISTICS

USAFW WRM amounting to one-half ton of ARB 963-1 Bomb Ejector Cartridges and 45 tons of LAU-3/A Rocket Launchers was shipped via MATS to the COMUS in response to Inventory Managers direction.⁴¹

20 October

COMBAT FORCES

USAFW air defense aircraft modification inputs were suspended and the manual air defense ground environment system was optimized

at some expense to the installation and testing of the 412⁴³ Air
Weapons Control System.

LOGISTICS

USAFE WRM assets were shipped to the COMUS via MATS as follows:
18 tons of Pylons; 92 tons of M39 20mm Ammunition; 41 tons of
M61 20mm Ammunition; 5 tons of M116A2 Fire Bombs; 46 tons of
LAU-3A Rocket Launchers, and 1/8 ton of Fuses for the BLU-1/B⁴⁵
Bombs.

22 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The first actual knowledge of the Cuban situation available
to CINCSAFE, aside from speculation and public news media, was
received during a meeting with USCINCEUR and his other component⁴⁷
commanders at Orly Airfield, Paris, at 1500 hours Zebra. The

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS) USCINCEUR forwarded a request to the JCS that any further directives for movement of WRM in the European theater be transmitted to his component commanders through USEUCOM headquarters. ⁴⁴

44. USCINCEUR

Source: Msg (TS/CADR), USCINCEUR to JCS,
20 Oct 62, subject not available,
EC 309 101483.

EC 309
(JA)

22 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

(TS) CINCUSAFE received instructions from USCINCEUR-SACEUR to intensify intelligence collection; security and anti-sabotage measures; command post manning, and checks of equipment and supplies. ⁴⁶ Except for the intelligence function, CINCUSAFE had instituted all of these actions beginning on 17 October. The USCINCEUR-SACEUR directives stated that "no measures would be taken which could be considered provocative or which might disclose operational plans."

46. USCINCEUR

Source: Msg (TS/CADR), USCINCEUR to JCS,
22 Oct 62, subject not available,
EC 309 101483.

EC 309
(J3)
Ref to
Operations

~~TOP SECRET~~

First Headquarters USAF Intelligence estimate of the Cuban Crisis reached CIRCUSAFE later in the day.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

23 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- a. Gradual return over a 48-hour period of USAF tactical aircraft from weapons training at Wheelus Air Base in Libya.
- b. Reduced tactical wing training in the United Kingdom and central Europe and expedited maintenance to raise the aircraft O/R rates to 90 percent.


d. Movement of 18 F-100's of the training wing at Wheelus to Moron to replace the F-104's, and

A total of 92 USAF tactical aircraft redeployed from the
Wheelus training center to home bases in the United Kingdom.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

30



(u) Until the return of F-100's from Wheelus to the United Kingdom, the 50th TFW maintained 12 F-100's on 15-minute alert, and all other aircraft in readiness, for conventional air superiority and air-to-ground Berlin contingency commitments. Similar action was taken with 1-F-105 squadron of the 36th TFW at Bitburg Air Base, Germany.



DECLAS
~~TOP SECRET~~

31

53 (TS)
Spain. This in effect doubled the number of USAF fighter interceptors on short alert in Spain. All units of the air defense force were wartime manned at all times. Four F-104's of the TAC rotational fighter interceptor squadron (FIS) moved from Moron to Hahn to assume a 15-minute alert posture when directed. 54 (TS) 54. 17AF/CC
All
USAF tactical wings went on training stand-down to enable 55 55. 17AF/CC
maintenance to reach maximum readiness. These units were required to report when they had 80 to 90 percent of possessed aircraft O/R.

Document

14-55 (TS/CHUR) 17AF/CC to CIRCUAFEL,
24 OCT 62 Subject not available,
60005-02M-200.

CLASSIFIED BY: HQ 17AF/CC
DECLASSIFY ON: 4 April 1988 by HQ 17AF/CC

DECLAS
~~TOP SECRET~~

87-0841-A 3-24-88 LMC

24 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

CSAF advised CINCSAFE that the JCS had urgently requested the
JOD to approach the President for the third time on the two stage
56
nuclear weapon authorization. 56. CSAF

File # 103-10000 CSAF to CINCSAFE,
24 Oct 62, subject not available.
AF CVC 9303E

CLASSIFIED



DECLAS
~~TOP SECRET~~

30 October

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(TS) The Command's survey of German Air Force bases to find a FUL
for the 366th TFW determined that Furstenfeldbruck in Bavaria was
a desirable location.

83

83. 17AF/CC

17AF/CC (CINCPACAF),
26 C + 62, 17AF/CC + available,
6000-62M-100

CLASSIFIED BY: HQ 17AF/CC

DECLASSIFY ON: 4 April 1988 by HQ 17AF/CC

DECLAS
~~TOP SECRET~~

1 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Nonconcurrency by SACEUR caused cancellation of Operation

87

HAWK EYE.

1 November

LOGISTICS

USAFE WRM shipments via MATS to the CONUS comprised 6 tons of
90
Pylons.

14 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

c. Return the USAFE training wing detachments to Wheelus.

~~SECRET~~24 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

(S) USCINCEUR advised his component commanders that amelioration in the international situation permitted a return to the normal readiness status.

98

Source: MSG (S/CADR), 98, USCINCEUR
 USCINCEUR to CINCSAFE,
 24 Nov 62, subject not available,
 ECTC 09 19439.

ECSC-
 (JB)
 P.P. 10
 operations

~~SECRET~~

16 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USAFE wing training detachments began movement back to the
USAFE Weapons Center at Wheelus to resume normal training.⁹⁵

All command units were directed to continue maximum efforts to
schedule maintenance, crew availability, and flying training in a
manner that would insure a command capability to generate the
forces required by SACEUR's nuclear strike program on a compressed
time schedule.⁹⁶ The USAFE combat force O/R rate exceeded⁹⁷
USCINCEUR-SACEUR requirements.

24 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

FOOTNOTES

The Background

1. Booklet, "For Commanders," Vol 2, No 10, 30 Oct 62, subj: The Cuban Crisis.
2. Ibid.
3. Msg DEF 320426, OSD to Svc Secy's, Unified Comdrs, JCS, 25 Oct 62.
4. Msg DEF 320794, OSD to Unified Comdrs and Other Addressees, c. 22 Oct 62.
5. New York Times, 26 Oct 62, "Navy Does Not Board Ship; Cargo Is Identified as Oil."
6. Washington Star, 9 Nov 62, "Castro Insists On Keeping 40 Red Bombers."
7. Chicago Tribune, 22 Nov 62, "US to Check Red Pullout of Jets By Air;" New York Times, 22 Nov 62, "14,200 Released By Air Reserves;" Baltimore Sun, 28 Nov 62, "Forces Begin Returning To Home Bases."
8. Aviation Week, 12 Nov 62, "What Was The Threat?;" Washington Post, 26 Oct 62, "US Stands Fast On Goal In Cuba."
9. Washington Star, 22 Nov 62, "Rocket Experts Cite Doubt That All Missiles Left Cuba."
10. Aviation Week, 15 Oct 62, "Pentagon Civil-Military Friction Increases."
11. Stars & Stripes, (European Ed., Darmstadt, Ger.), 23 Jan 63, p. 7.

The Air Force Cuban Crisis Status

12. Msg SAFOI-5B 1916/62, SAFS to ALMAJCOM, 1 Dec 62.

USAFE Actions In The Cuban Crisis

13. Washington Post, 21 Oct 62, "US Moves Linked To Cuba Crisis."
14. Msg SAFOI-5B 1916/62, SAFIS to ALMAJCOM, 1 Dec 62.
15. Msg DIAAP-3 93454, DIA to AIG-497, 27 Oct 62. SECRET.
16. Deptel 581, Secy State to USNMR SHAPE and Other Addressees, 28 Oct 62. SECRET.
17. Msg TEDGDID 261-62, AFE-IN to AIG 18 and Other Addressees, 28 Oct 62. SECRET/NOFORN.
18. Washington Star, 9 Nov 62, "Castro Insists On Keeping Red Bombers;" Washington Post, 12 Dec 62, "Inside Story On Adlai Stevenson," by Drew Pearson.
19. Ltr., Hq TUSLOC (USAFE) to Hq USAFE (OIPA), 10 Jan 63, subj: USAFE-U28 Report. For Official Use Only.

20. Intv., USAF Historian, Mr. Royce E. Eckwright, with Lt Col L. B. Thompson, Exec Off, Hq USAF DCS/Ops, 4 Dec 62. **SECRET**. A CINCUSAFE summary of command actions during the Cuban Crisis is contained in TS Mag OIN 62M-1714, 6 Dec 62.
21. Mag CINC 62M 1303, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR/CASF, 19 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**; Mag CINC 32191, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 19 Oct 62. **SECRET**; Mag JCS DTG 061446Z to USCINCEUR, Info to CINCUSAFE, 6 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**; Mag AFIPD-PLCP 91694, CASF to CINCUSAFE, 18 Oct 62. **SECRET**.
22. Mag CINC 32191 to USCINCEUR, 19 Oct 62. **SECRET**.
23. Mag ECJ09 101483, USCINCEUR to JCS, 20 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.
24. Mag ECJ09 101510, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE-CINCUSAFER-CINCHAVEUR and Comdr SOTFE, 22 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET/NOFORN**; Mag SCHLOS - 00373, SACEUR to CINCUSAFE and Other Addressees, 23 Oct 62. **SECRET**.
25. Intv., USAF Historian, Mr. R. E. Eckwright, with Maj Gen G. B. Greene, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Hq USAF, 6 Dec 62. **TOP SECRET**.
26. Mag OPLW 62M 1320, CINCUSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 22 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.
27. Mag CINC 62M 1336, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 23 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**; Mag ECJ09 17545, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 23 Oct 62. **CONFIDENTIAL**; Mag CINC 62M 1400, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR/CASF, 26 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.
28. Mag OCP 62M 1387, CINCUSAFE to Comdr TUSLOO, 25 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.
29. Mag JCS 7035, JCS to USCINCEUR, 27 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.
30. Mag O-COC5-62M-0252, Comdr 17th AF to Comdrs 26th, 49th TFW's, 27 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**; And Subsequent Wing reports. **TOP SECRET**.
31. Mag OPLW 62M 1406, CINCUSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 26 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**; Mag O-62M-500, Comdr 17th AF to CINCUSAFE, 30 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.
32. Mag CINC 32202, CINCUSAFE to COPS GAF, 1 Nov 62. **SECRET**;
- Mag CINC 32203, CINCUSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 1 Nov 62. **SECRET**;
33. Mag CINC 32207, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 14 Nov 62. **SECRET**;
- Mag ECJ09 18821, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 14 Nov 62. **CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN**; Mag ECJCO 18958, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, **SECRET**; Hq USAF Briefing for CASF, Wiesbaden, c. December 1962. **TOP SECRET**.

Chronology

34. Mag JCS DTG 061446Z, JCS to USCINCEUR, Info CINCUSAFE, 6 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.
35. Mag CINC 62M 1303, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR and CSAP, 19 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET**.

36. Intv., USAF Historian, Mr. R. E. Eckwright, with Col F. L. Smith, Ch/War Plans Div, DCS/Ops, Hq USAF, 4 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
37. Ibid.
38. Hq USAF DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to COMUS, 4 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
39. Mag AFYPD-PLCP 91694, CSAF to CINCUSAF, 18 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
40. Mag CINC 62M 1303, CINCUSAF to USCINCEUR and CSAF, 19 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
41. Hq USAF DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to COMUS, 14 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
42. Mag CINC 32191, CINCUSAF to USCINCEUR, 19 Oct 62. **SECRET.**
43. Intv., USAF Historian, Mr. R. E. Eckwright, with Col H. G. Gibson, Ch/Air Def Div, DCS/Ops, Hq USAF, 5 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
44. Mag ECJD9 101483, USCINCEUR to JCS, Info CINCUSAF, 20 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
45. Hq USAF DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to COMUS, 14 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
46. Mag ECJCO9 101483, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAF/CINCUSABER/ CINCHAVEUR and COMSOTFE, 22 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET/NOFORN.**
47. Intv., USAF Historian, Mr. R. E. Eckwright, with Maj Gen G. B. Greene, Jr., DCS for Operations, Hq USAF, 5 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
48. Mag OPLW 62M 1320, CINCUSAF to Comdr 17th AF, 22 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
49. Mag CINC 62M 1336, CINCUSAF to USCINCEUR, 23 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET;** Mag ECJCO9 17545, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAF, 23 Oct 62. **CONFIDENTIAL.**
50. Mag CINC 62M 1336, CINCUSAF to USCINCEUR, 23 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET;** Mag OCOC5 62M 0191, Comdr 17th AF to Comdr 7272M AB Wg, 23 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
51. Mag O-COC5-62M 200, Comdr 17th AF to CINCUSAF, 24 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
52. Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
53. Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Gibson, 5 Dec 62. **SECRET.**
54. Mag O-COC5 62M 200, Comdr 17th AF to CINCUSAF, 24 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
55. Ibid.
56. Mag AFCVC 93038, CSAF to CINCUSAF, 24 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
57. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 24/17152. **TOP SECRET.**
58. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entries 24/17152 and 24/19002. **TOP SECRET.**
59. Mag O-COC5 62M 200, Comdr 17th AF to CINCUSAF, 24 Oct 62. **TOP SECRET.**
60. Ibid.
61. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 24/20052. **TOP SECRET.**

62. Msg CINC 62M 1376, 25 Oct 62. TOP SECRET; Msg OCP 62M 1387, CINCUSAFE to Comdr TUSLOG, 25 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
63. Intv., USAF Historian, Mr. R. E. Eckwright, with Col F. L. Smith, Ch/War Plans Div, DCS/Ops, Hq USAF, 5 Dec 62. TOP SECRET.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 25/1905Z. SECRET.
67. Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 5 Dec 62. TOP SECRET.
68. Msg CINC 62M 1400, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR and CSAF, 26 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
69. Msg CINC 62M 1402, 26 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
70. Msg OPLW 62M 1406, CINCUSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 26 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
71. Msg JCS 7035, JCS to USCINCEUR, 27 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
72. Msg O-ODC5 62M 0252, Comdr 17th AF to Comdrs 36th and 49th TFW's, 27 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
73. Msg SH 41396, SACEUR to Comdr 4th ATAF and Other Addressees, 27 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
74. Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 5 Dec 62. TOP SECRET.
75. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 27/1100Z. TOP SECRET.
76. Ibid.
77. Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62. SECRET.
78. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 28/2110Z. TOP SECRET.
79. Ibid.
80. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 29/0700Z. TOP SECRET.
81. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entries 1835Z and 1845Z, 29 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
82. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 29/2200Z. TOP SECRET.
83. Msg OCOC 62M 500, Comdr 17th AF to CINCUSAFE, 30 Oct 62. TOP SECRET.
84. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 30/0150Z. TOP SECRET.
85. Ibid.
86. Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 5 Dec 62. TOP SECRET.
87. Msg CINC 32202, CINCUSAFE to COPS GAF, 1 Nov 62. SECRET;
Msg CINC 32203, CINCUSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 1 Nov 62. SECRET;
Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62. SECRET.
88. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 2/1900Z. TOP SECRET.
89. USAF Senior CP Controller Log Entry 2/2115Z. TOP SECRET;
Msg OCOC5 62M 0287, Comdr 17th AF to CINCUSAFE, 2 Nov 62. TOP SECRET.
90. Hq USAF DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to CONUS, 14 Dec 62. SECRET.
91. Msg CINC 32207, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 14 Nov 62. SECRET.
92. Msg ECJCO9 18821, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 14 Nov 62. CONFIDENTIAL.
93. Msg OOT 62M 1586, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 14 Nov 62. TOP SECRET.

94. Msg BJCO 18958, USKINCEUR to CINCSAFE, 16 Nov 62. SECRET.
95. Intv., Mr. Rehnright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62. SECRET.
96. Msg OTO 62721, CINCSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 16 Nov 62. SECRET.
97. Intv., Mr. Rehnright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62. SECRET.
98. Msg BJCO9 19439, USKINCEUR to CINCSAFE, 24 Nov 62. SECRET.

GLOSSARY

ABW	Air Base Wing
ADC	Air Defense Command
AFB	Air Force Base
AFR	Air Force Reserve
ASAP	As Soon As Possible
AWCS	Air Weapons Control System
BMES	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command
CINCSAF	Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe
COMUS	Continental United States
CSAF	Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
DOD	Department of Defense
FIS	Fighter Interceptor Squadron
FOL	Forward Operating Location
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Advisory Group
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MRBM	Mobile Medium Range Ballistic Missile
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLT	Not Later Than
NM	Nautical Mile
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NSP	Nuclear Strike Program
OAS	Organization of American States
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OR	Operationally Ready
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
QRA	Quick Reaction Alert
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile

SOC
SOD

Sector Operations Center
Secretary of Defense

TAC
TDE
TFS
TFW

Tactical Air Command
Temporary Duty
Tactical Fighter Squadron
Tactical Fighter Wing

UN
USAF
USAFS
USCINCPAC
USMACV

United Nations
United States Air Force
United States Air Forces in Europe
United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe
United States European Command

WM

War Reserve Material

EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

For The Period

6 October Thru 24 November 1962

Copy No 1 of 5

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

For the Period

6 October Thru 24 November 1962

6 October

COMLAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

JCS Review

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

(6 October Continued)

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

7 October thru 13 October

ALL ENTRIES

Negative

14 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USAF Command Post Summaries stated a priority requirement for expeditious return of TAC's Fox Able 137 from European theater to the COMUS. (Ref: TS Msg CINC 62M 1303, CINCSAFE to USCINCEUR and CSAF, 19 Oct 62).

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

(14 October Continued)

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

15 October thru 16 October

ALL ENTRIES

Negative

17 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

CINCSAFE directed an increase in the USAFE Command Post watches. General Landon also directed that command and control communications projects in the USAFE area be pushed forward with all possible speed. (Ref: (S) Intv., Mr. R. E. Eckwright, USAFE Historian, with Col F. L. Smith, Ch/War Plans Div, DCS/Ops, Hq USAFE, 4 Dec 62.)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

CINCSAFE directed that the combat readiness of all USAFE tactical units be immediately reviewed. (Ref: (S) Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62.)

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

(17 October Continued)

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

CINCUSAFE was directed to ready for immediate MATS airlift to the United States WRM amounting to over 1 million pounds of ammunition; ejector cartridges applicable to F-105's; 20mm HEI ammunition, and pylons for F-100, F-104, and F-105. (Ref: (S) Hq USAF DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to CONUS, 4 Dec 62.)

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

18 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

CSAF Review

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

(18 October Continued)

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

19 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(19 October Continued)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (CONT'D)

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

USAFE WRM amounting to one-half ton of ARD 863-1 Bomb
Ejector Cartridges and 45 tons of LAU-3/A Rocket Launchers was shipped
via MITS to the CONUS in response to Inventory Managers direction.

(Ref: (S) Hq USAFE DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to CONUS, 14 Dec 62.)

(19 October Continued)

LOGISTICS (CONT'D)

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

20 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

USAF air defense aircraft modification inputs were suspended and the manual air defense ground environment system was optimized at some expense to the installation and testing of the 412L Air Weapons Control System. (Ref: (S) Intv., Mr. R. E. Eckwright, USAF Historian, with Col H. C. Gibson, Ch/Air Def Div, DCS/Ops, Hq USAF, 5 Dec 62.)

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

(20 October Continued)

LOGISTICS

USCINCEUR Review

USAFE WRM assets were shipped to the COMUS via MATS as follows:
18 tons of Pylons; 92 tons of M39 20mm Ammunition; 41 tons of M61 20mm
Ammunition; 5 tons of M116A2 Fire Bombs; 46 tons of LAU-3A Rocket
Launchers, and 1/8 ton of Fuzes for the BLU-1/B Bombs. (Ref: (S) Hq
USAFE DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to COMUS, 14 Dec 62.)

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

21 October

ALL ENTRIES

Negative

22 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USCINCEUR Review

(22 October Continued)

COMMAND AND CONTROL (CONT'D)

USCINCEUR Review

The first actual knowledge of the Cuban situation available to CINCSAFE, aside from speculation and public news media, was received during a meeting with USCINCEUR and his other component commanders at Orly Airfield, Paris, at 1500 hours Zebra. The first AFM estimate of the Cuban crisis reached CINCSAFE later in the day. (Ref: (S) Invt., Mr. R. E. Eckwright, USAF Historian, with Major General G. B. Greene, Jr., DJS for Operations, Hq USAF, 5 Dec 62.)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

(22 October Continued)

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

23 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(23 October Continued)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (CONT'D)

COMBAT FORCES

A total of 92 USAF tactical aircraft redeployed from the
Wheeler training center to home bases in the United Kingdom. (Ref: (S)
Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62.)

(23 October Continued)

COMBAT FORCES (CONT'D)

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

24 October

COMTAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

CSAF Review

COMBAT FORCES

17AF Review

(24 October Continued)

COMBAT FORCES (CONT'D)

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

25 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(25 October Continued)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (CONT'D)

COMBAT FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

(25 October Continued)

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

26 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(26 October Continued)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (CONT'D)

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

(26 October Continued)

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

27 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

JCS Review

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

17 AF Review

USCINCEUR Review

(27 October Continued)

COMBAT FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

28 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

(28 October Continued)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

COMBAT FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

29 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

(29 October Continued)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

(29 October Continued)

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

30 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

17AF Review

COMBAT FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

(30 October Continued)

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

31 October

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

(31 October Continued)

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

1 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Nonconcurrence by SACEUR caused cancellation of Operation

HAWK EYE. (Ref: (S) Msg CINC 32202, CINCUSAFE to COFS GAF, 1 Nov 62; (S) Msg CINC 32203, CINCUSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 1 Nov 62, and (S) Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62.)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

2 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

COMBAT FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

(2 November Continued)

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

3 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Negative

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

USAFE WRM shipments via MATS to the CONUS comprised 6 tons of Pylons. (Ref: (S) Hq USAFE DCS/Mat, Report of Shipments to CONUS, 14 Dec 62.)

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

4 November thru 13 November

ALL ENTRIES

Negative

14 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USCINCEUR Review

CINCUSAFE agreed that the F-104C squadron at Hahn and the F-100C's at Moron could remain in place for the time being, but reiterated to USCINCEUR that USAF could not maintain its existing readiness posture indefinitely. (Ref: TS Msg OOT 62M 1586, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 14 Nov 62.)

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

(14 November Continued)

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

15 November

ALL ENTRIES

Negative

16 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USCINCEUR Review

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

USAFE wing training detachments began movement back to the USAFE Weapons Center at Wheelus to resume normal training. (Ref: (S) Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62.)

(16 November Continued)

COMBAT FORCES (CONT'D)

All command units were directed to continue maximum efforts to schedule maintenance, crew availability, and flying training in a manner that would insure a command capability to generate the forces required by SACEUR's nuclear strike program on a compressed time schedule. (Ref: (S) Msg OTO 62721, CINCSAFE to Comdr 17th AF, 16 Nov 62.)

The USAFE combat force O/R rate exceeded USJINCEUR/SACEUR requirements. (Ref: (S) Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Col Smith, 4 Dec 62.)

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

17 November thru 23 November

ALL ENTRIES

Negative

24 November

COMMAND AND CONTROL

USCINCEUR Review

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Negative

COMBAT FORCES

Negative

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

Negative

AIRLIFT

Negative

PERSONNEL

Negative

LOGISTICS

Negative

BUDGET

Negative

MISCELLANEOUS

Negative

USAFE ALERT STATUS

October - November 1962

<u>Oct Pre-Crisis Alert</u>			<u>Crisis Alert Peak</u>		
<u>UNITS</u>	<u>15 MIN</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>15 MIN</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>DATE OF PEAK</u>
32 FIS	2	6	2	6	No Change
431 FIS	2	8	4	14	23 Oct
435 FIS	2	4	2	17	29 Oct
496 FIS	2	8	2	8	No Change
497 FIS	2	8	4	16	29 Oct
525 FIS	2	8	2	8	No Change
526 FIS	2	8	2	8	No Change
20 TFW	12	23	14	39	25 Oct
36 TFW	9	24	10	16	27 Oct
43 TFW	12	24	14	36	25 Oct
49 TFW	9	24	9	24	No Change
50 TFW	4	35	4	35	21 Oct
81 TFW	12	21	14	28	25 Oct
353 TFS	4	10	5	10	25 Oct
366 TFW	<u>Not on Alert</u>		<u>Not on Alert</u>		
523 TFS	4	9	8	5	29 Oct
613 TFS	4	9	8	5	29 Oct
10 TRW	4	21	8	26	25 Oct
66 TRW	8	10	8	11	3 Nov
38 TRW	48	3	48	3	No Change
420 ARS	1	4	7	0	25 Oct

SOURCE: USAFE Command Post Reports;
 Intv., Mr. Eckwright with Captain A. P. Hamrick, Current Actions
 Division, DCS/Operations, 13 December 1962.